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Compensation For Unsolicited Disclosure
Of Business Ideas
Noahson v. Gunther Brewing Co.'
Plaintiff filed a declaration in the Superior Court of
Baltimore City seeking recovery from the defendant for
the wrongful conversion of an idea. The plaintiff intro-
duced in evidence a copy of a letter which he had sent to
a local sports announcer in care of the defendant. His
letter stated:
"I want to say a word about your commercials. I think
they are terrific, and whoever writes them up has
done a marvelous job!
I had an idea that I thought I would pass on to you,
and perhaps you could play around with it.
I believe that you have an opportunity for a new
theme for Gunther in:
THE G RUN
The G Run means the Gunther Run. It means a
big run on Gunther Beer. The trick of it is, that is you
take the letters from the words, 'The G Run' you
scramble them up and you have the word Gunther.
Can you do anything with it? I thought I would
present it to you."2
This suggestion was used by defendant in its adver-
tising program, and then plaintiff brought suit for com-
pensation. The defendant demurred to the plaintiff's
declaration, and the court was called upon to determine
the sole question of whether or not the declaration stated
a good, cause of action. The Superior Court held that it
did not and sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend. In the memorandum opinion Judge Foster said,
"The facts pleaded do not permit the slightest intimation
that the idea was released in confidence or that the de-
fendant was guilty of any wrong in obtaining it."' The
court indicated that in order to have a property right in
something as intangible as an idea, four criteria must be
' Daily Record, July 6, 1960 (Md. 1960).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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satisfied, namely those stated by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Belt.
4
In the Hamilton case the court said, "a person has such a
property right . . . when the idea is original, concrete,
useful, and is disclosed in circumstances which, reasonably
construed, clearly indicate that compensation is contem-
plated if it is accepted and used."5 The Superior Court
held as a matter of law that the requirement of expectation
of compensation could in no way be inferred from the
plaintiff's allegations. However, the court by implica-
tion did recognize that there would have been a cause of
action if the element of expected compensation were
present.
Since recognition of property rights in an idea is a
relatively new development in the law, it is difficult to
ascribe any majority-minority view. An analysis of the
cases would seem to indicate that in a majority of juris-
dictions today, the older rule that there can be no prop-
erty right in an idea is still predominant.6 However, the
modern tendency favors recognition of these rights if the
above criteria, or other similar criteria, have been, satis-
fied. There are no previous Maryland cases directly in
point.T
The subject matter here concerns ideas which have not
been copyrighted8 and which are incapable of being
patented because they cannot be reduced to concrete form.9
The scope of this note concerns advertising slogans and/or
business suggestions, presented by individuals or agencies
not in competition with the defendant, which have re-
cently received protection both in the law and equity
courts under the aegis of literary property."0 The public
policy problem in this area involves a weighing of the
public interest in the "promulgation of new ideas and
'210 F. 2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
SId., 708.
- 170 A.L.R. 449 (1947).
In Robertson v. Berry, 50 Md. 591 (1879), a publisher was held to have
a property right in the title of his work.
8 Copyright law seems to say that it is not the Idea that Is protected, but
the manner of expression. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn Inc., 150 F. 2d 612
(2nd Cir. 1945).
9 One of the leading cases concerning a patentable idea is Matarese v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F. 2d 631 (2nd Cir. 1946).
10 J. A. Healey v. R. H. Macy & Company, 277 N.Y. 681, 14 N.E. 2d 388
(1938) (where plaintiff's plan for Christmas advertising campaign included
use of the slogan, "A Macy Christmas Means A Happy New Year");
Jenkins v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 128 Misc. 284, 219 N.Y.S. 196 (1926).
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new expressions of old ones, and the author's interest in
being assured of some profit [from] his work."'1
In discussing the law relating to ideas, it would be well
to note generally that the area had been deemed settled
until the past thirty years. From that time to the present,
the law has been in a state of flux. Originally, no prop-
erty right in an idea was recognized. In 1892, in one of
the earliest cases on the subject, the New York Court of
Appeals in Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United
States, 2 dealt with the problem of an inventor who, in
order to induce a person to employ him, divulged in confi-
dence a system of advertising which the defendant com-
pany subsequently used without giving compensation.
The court, despite the confidential nature of the plaintiff's
disclosure, held that without an agreement for compen-
sation the originator cannot recover, his property in, it
being lost by the disclosure. Then, in 1906, the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey stated that an idea cannot be
property because "it lacks that dominium, that capability
of being applied by its originator to his own use which is
the essential characteristic of property."'" In the same
opinion the court declared, "it has never, in the absence of
contract or statute, been held . . . that mere ideas are
capable of legal ownership and protection.' 1 4 A slight
shift in emphasis is seen in 1917 when Justice Holmes
stated that property in ideas is but " an. unanalyzed ex-
pression of certain secondary consequences of the primary
fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements
of good faith." 5 Mr. Justice Holmes implied that if there
is any protection given to ideas, it is not on the basis of any
property right, but on the basis of inequities which the
law will not allow to stand. The courts adhered to the
basic theme that ideas were as free as air.'6 The reason
usually given for refusing to recognize property in ideas
stem from the view that a property right must be con-
nected with some corporeal thing.7 Further, the courts
were hesitant because of the practical difficulty of deter-
" Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas - A Judge's Approach, 43 Va. L.
Rev. 375, 377 (1957).
"132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892).
"Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N.J. Eq. 575, 64 A. 436, 438 (1906).
"Id., 438.
"E. I. Dupont de Nemours v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
16 Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56, 58 (1930).
1" This conservative point of view is reflected in MCCLINToCK, EQuiTY (2nd
ed. 1948) § 153, 408, where it is stated that "mere ideas are not property
which equity will protect even if they have economic value; even when
embodied in an invention or design .... "
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mining whether the plaintiff originated the idea, and if so,
whether the defendant appropriated it or originated it
independently."8
One of the major shifts in emphasis came in 1935 from
the Supreme Court of Indiana in Liggett and Meyer To-
bacco Co. v. Meyer,1" where the court upheld the property
right of the plaintiff in an unsolicited business idea which
the defendant used extensively in advertising its product,
even though the idea submitted was changed slightly by
the defendant when used by him.2" In 1936, the Supreme
Court of Washington protected the property right in the
slogan "The Beer of the Century," which was offered by
an advertising agency after solicitation by the defendant.2
Giving expression to this new trend, the court said:
"While we recognize that an abstract idea as such may
not be the subject of a property right, yet, when it
takes upon itself the concrete form which we find
in the instant case, it is our opinion that it then be-
comes a property right .... Of course, it must be
something novel and new...."I'
Thus a change in the law can be observed, toward the
position that there is something to protect in an idea
despite its incorporeal quality. Two recent cases which
the Baltimore court cited show the rationale behind the
change of policy.
The case most heavily relied upon by Judge Foster was
Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Belt." There the plaintiff had pre-
sented to the defendant an idea for a radio program which
would feature talented youngsters from local schools. The
defendant contracted to hire the plaintiff as producer,
subject to approval of the program by school authorities.
The approval was not granted, and the contract was ter-
minated. Later approval was given, but the defendant
hired someone else. The court awarded greater compen-
sation than that stipulated in the contract, protecting the
iIbid. In accord, Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Corp. et al., 70 F. 2d 345
(8th Cir. 1934) (scheme to eliminate chassis sag) ; Moore v. Ford Motor
Co., 43 F. 2d 685 (2nd Cir. 1930) (method of financing installment buying
of autos). See also McRae, Disclosure of Specific Types o1 Ideas: Mis-
appropriation, 9 Cleveland-Marshall L. Rev. 29 (1960).
19101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935).
20 See Note, Property Rights in Business Schemes, 44 Yale L. J. 1269
(1935).
1How J. Ryan and Associates v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600,
55 P. 2d 1053 (1936).
Id., 1054.
2210 F. 2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
[VOL. XXI
1961] NOAHSON v. GUNTHER BREWING 143
format of the plaintiff's idea on the basis of the four
criteria mentioned above. Judge Foster, in the Gunther
case, emphasized that:
"The practical result of finding that the plaintiff has
stated a good cause of action by merely -alleging that
he had disclosed an original, concrete, useful idea to
the defendant without advising in some manner that
he expected compensation therefore, would open an
area for a flood of baseless claims .... Business firms
are entitled to know at the outset, when an idea or
suggestion is presented, whether or not they are to be
charged with appropriating it, if they should at some
future time employ it."24
In Galanis v. Proctor and Gamble Corporation,25 a
housewife wrote defendant praising their product, Tide
Soap, and suggesting they add a granulated bluing to their
product. She also suggested that the product be called
"Blue." The defendant replied that the soap she proposed
would only be suitable for laundry and dishes and there-
fore would be commercially valueless. Subsequently, the
defendant produced a soap called "Blue Cheer," and the
plaintiff sued for wrongful appropriation of her idea. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the defendant's motion for summary judgment and
said that the criteria mentioned in the Hamilton case
would govern the retrial of this case. Although only the
first three criteria were mentioned by this court, Judge
Foster in his opinion assumed that the requirement of
expectation of compensation was already satisfied because
the plaintiff, in her original letter, stated that she had an
idea she wanted to sell.
It seems that the courts, by giving protection, to un-
patentable ideas, are trying to effectuate the intent of the
parties while also weighing the natural rights or equities
found in the particular case. The result of this increased
emphasis on the subjective element is a more flexible
pattern of decisions; and while perhaps some of the cer-
tainty has been destroyed, it has been replaced by more
equitable decisions based on all the circumstances of the
particular case.
To illustrate the internal structure of this newer ap-
proach, one begins with an individual who has originated
Noabson v. Gunther Brewing Co., Daily Record, July 6, 1960 (Md. 1955).
153 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
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an unpatentable business idea. This idea, to use a contract
analogy, serves as the originator's consideration. The
courts often refer to this as the plaintiff's offer. This idea
is submitted to the defendant company who in turn uses it
without compensating the originator. Nothing else con-
sidered, the equities favor the plaintiff because the de-
fendant used something that the plaintiff presented upon
expectation of compensation. This 'basic core is subject to
several other circumstances which can and often do shift
the equities in favor of the defendant. The first way to
shift the equities is to say that the idea was not really
worth anything, for example, that it was not novel, origi-
nal, or useful. This, then, is a failure of consideration, or
is an offer which is not capable of being accepted, de-
pending on which contract theory one follows.2" This senti-
ment was expressed in Matarese v. Moore-McCrmack
Lines,27 where the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit stated:
"Courts have justly been assiduous in defeating at-
tempts to delve into the pockets of business firms
through spurious claims for compensation for the use
of ideas. Thus to be rejected are attempts made by
telephoning or writing vague general ideas to business
corporations and then seizing upon some later general
similarity between their products and the notions pro-
pounded as a basis for damages. '28
Another way to shift the equities in favor of the de-
fendant is seen in the case at bar. Assuming that the idea
is original, concrete, and useful, it must also be disclosed
under circumstances which, reasonably construed, clearly
show to the defendant that compensation is ,expected by
the plaintiff. If this expectation is not indicated, it does
not seem unreasonable for the defendant to use the idea
without giving compensation, since all rights to an idea
are admittedly given up at the moment of disclosure un-
less a request is then made for compensation.2 9 To allow
Courts often award compensation on the basis of contract or quasi
contract, rather than in tort for conversion. For a breakdown of cases
along these lines, see Nimmer, Law of Ideas, 27 S. Cal. L. Rev. 119 (1954).
For a thorough study of California law, where there is heavy traffic in the
Idea business, see Kaplan, Implied Contract and the Law of Literary
Property, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 28 (1954).
- 158 F. 2d 631, 634 (2nd Cir. 1946).
Ibid.
2 Supra, n. 24.
[VOL. XXI
1961] NOAHSON v. GUNTHER BREWING 145
the plaintiff to claim compensation after the idea is
originally disclosed would put an undue burden on the de-
fendant-recipient for use of what were originally friendly
suggestions.
A good illustration of a court looking to the equities of
the particular case is seen in Galanis v. Proctor and
Gamble."° The court there said that the plaintiff's idea was
not protected by contract, patent, or copyright. It also said
that by the voluntary disclosure of an idea, the person dis-
closing it loses all exclusive rights. The court added, how-
ever, that even "if plaintiff has no property right in an
idea, and.., no contract for the sale or use ... the de-
fendant may be held liable in quantum meruit on the
theory of unjust enrichment, where defendant utilized a
concrete and novel idea submitted by the plaintiff."'" Cer-
tainly here the court was intent on protecting the plaintiff's
interest regardless of the lack of either a prior contract,
patent, or copyright.
It is interesting to note that in many of the cases cited,
where judgment was in favor of the plaintiff, the court
was more concerned with protecting the plaintiff than in
protecting property rights in an idea. Thus it seems that
the trend in many jurisdictions is that if an idea is really
valuable and novel, and the defendant knows or should
have known that compensation is expected if it is used, and
the defendant does use it without paying the plaintiff,
the courts will more than likely award the plaintiff dam-
ages on one or more of the many contract, tort, or equitable
doctrines, rather than adhering solely to protection of
property rights in an idea.
LEwis NooNBEa
80 Supra, n. 25, 38.
Id., 38.
